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This paper examines the stochastic processes generated by sequential games that involve 
repeated play of a specific game. Such sequential games are viewed as adaptive decision-making 
processes over time wherein each player updates his “stat? after every play. This revision may 
involve one’s strategy or one’s prior distribution on the competitor’s strategies. It it shown that 
results from the theory of discrete time Markov processes can be applied to gain insight into the 





sequential decision making 
1. Introduction 
This paper shows that the asymptotic behavior of sequential games that invollve 
repeated play of a specific game can be studied by analyzing a discrete time Markov 
process with a continuous tate space. A taxonomy for such games emerges friom 
our analysis. Seque:lti?l games more general than repeated play arise in contexts as 
diverse as individual and group behavior, economics and stochastic ontrol [12. 22, 
23, 29, 34, 35, 36, 371. Specific examples of games in the social sciences include 
oligopoly games in economics, experimentally repeated matrix games, iterated 
Prisoners’ Dilemma games, and other psychological games that are reviewed in 
Shapley and Shubik [33]. There does not yet exist an empirically verified dynamic 
theory for behaviors that are displayed by individuals actually playing sequential 
games. 
A sequential game is modeled in this paper as an adaptive decision making 
process over time in which players use their past experiences in making subsequent 
decisions. Such a viewpoint i E ~1~0 shared to differing degrees by the “fictitious 
plzy” literature in game theory and the literature in multi-person interactions in the 
behavioral sciences. i)ur model and results are applicable in both areas. 
* This paper is based on the author’s Ph.D. dissertation submitted to Yale University. The author 
would like to acknowledge the help given him by Professors M.J. Sobel, W. Whitt, and M. Shubik, and a 
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Section 2 contains an abstract model for sequential games. This model is 
illustrated in Section 3 with an example of a game that arises in ec,.uromic theory. 
Section 4 spells out the major issues of interest in the study of sequential games. A 
question of primary concern is whether or not a sequential game has an equilibrium 
distribution. For a “large” class of games this question is answered affirmatively in 
Section 5, In Section 6, a taxonomy for sequential games is proposed. The results of 
Sections 7 and 8 help identify where a given game falls in the proposed taxonomy. 
In particular, this identification is based on results that follow almost directly from 
the Uniform Ergodic Theorem of Yosida and Kakutani [39]. The application of 
these results to some of our models is facilitated by results of Doeblin and Fortet [8] 
and Norman [25]. Section 9 presents an application of the theory developed in this 
paper :o the economic game of Section 3. 
2. The model 
In the remainder of this paper the term sequential game is used to denote an 
iterated, simultaneous move, N-person game of perfect information where player 
i’s pure strategy options comprise the measurable space (Pi, Pi). Before describing 
the mathematical model two examples are indicated. 
A player’s state in the first model is characterized by the mixed strategy that he 
plans to employ. The state space of the game is then X = XE, Z(P), where Z(F;) 
,s the set of probability measures on Pi, the Bore1 sets of Pi. A state x E X is given 
by x = (zl, z2,. . . , z”), where z i E Z(P). The joint action chosen by all players is 
called an outcome of the game. The set (0, a,,) of all possible outcomes, the oufcome 
space, is the product space XL, (Pi, 9i). The game evolvp- %m one state to the 
next in the following fashion. If & = (t :, z i, . . . , z t) is the stake cf the game on play 
k, then the outcome of play k lies in B E %I0 with probability T(B 1 xk). The 
probability measures T( l 1 x), x E X are determined by the player’s strategies 
1 2 
I . , z 7 As a result of outcome cu E 0, each player revises his mixed strategy 
itaiei’which leads to the state of the game on play k + 1 being & tI = & (xk). For 
each Q! E 0: r, is an updating operator on X that describes how the players revise 
their strategies. We shall use the fact chat X is a compact metric space if fi is a 
compact metric space for all i. 
In the second realization, aplayer’s tate is characterized by the prior distribution 
he has for the other player’s choices. The state space of the game is then 
X = XT”_, Z(P) where P-’ = x:1 P” and Z(P) is the set of probability measures 
on Pi, the Bore1 sets of P-‘. A state of x E X is given by x = (z ‘, z*, . . . , z”), 
where z i E Z(P-‘, iFi). Thus zi is the product measure obtained by the usual 
extension of the measure hi defined by 
Ai (B) = fi Pij (B,), 
j = 1 
where B = (&, l . *, Bi-1, Bi+t;. ge 3 BN), . 
)Zi 
Bi E Pj for all j and PiI 
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are probability measures on (P’, Pj), j = 1,2,. . . , N. In words, pii (Bj) is player i’s 
prior probability that player j will choose an action that is an element of Bj E gj. 
Player i’s decision rule 6, is assumed to be a mapping that defines ~1 probability 
mehsure 6, (2’) on SP, for each state z i. The joint action chosen by all the players is 
called an outcome of the game. The set (0, a,,) of all possible outcomes, the 
OUCORI~ space, is the product space XL, (P,, Pi). This game evolves from state to 
state in a manner similar to that in the above paragraph except hat the updating 
operators in this case describe how the players revise their priors and that the 
probability measures r( l 1 x), x E X are determined by the players’ decision rules 
&(z’), i = 1,2 ,..., N. 
Both models for sequential games are defined by four objects: a measurable 
space (X, Z) called the state space, a measurable space (0, aO) called the outcome 
space, (r,, c E 0}, a set of updating operators on X, and {r( .I x), x E X}, a set of 
probability measures on 0. If the game is in state x E X, it moves to state 
f’,,(x) E X with probability ~(a 1 x). This evolution is defined by a discrete time 
Markov process {X,,, n 3 0) with state space J’ and a stationary transition kernel 
W,A)=S,~&,J )) (d 1 ), h x T v x w ere SYA denotes the characteristic function of a 
Bore1 set A of X. If 0 is a finite set (in which case we let S& be the power set of CQ, 
P&A) = 2 + 1 x). 
o:f-,(x)EA 
Let m be a distribution over all possible starting states for the game. Then the 
random variable X,,, (for details see Doob [9], page 190) is the nth coordinate of a 
X-valued function on a probability space (Xy=, X, %I,, P, >, where P,,, is a probabil- 
ity measure induced by m on X. If m is concentrated on {t} we denote P,,, by Pt. 
The collection (X, S), (0, go) of measurable spaces, operators {&, IT E O}, and 
probability measures {r( l I t), t E X}, is referred to by Iosifescu and Theordorescu 
[ 151, as a homogeneous random system with complete connections. It is an abstraction 
and formalization of a setup first introduced by Onicesu and Mihoc [27], under the 
name of a chain with complete connections. The latter authors were the first to 
observe the crucial property that the state sequence {Xn, n 3 0) is a discrete time 
Markov process. 
3. An example - the duopoly game 
Consider the two person non-zero-sum game in normal form with pay-off matrix. 
1 
1 10,12) (:,20) [ 2 (162) 1 (393) l 
This game is to be played repeatedly as a simultaneous move ga:ne. 5Iere 
Pi = {1,2}, i = 1,2. Therefore, the outcome space for this game is 0 = 
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i&j) 1 i E {l,% j E U,2H, i.e., one and only one, of the four outcomes at = (1, l), 
a2 = (I, 3, a3 = (2, l), and a4 = (2,2) can occur on any given play - where (i, j) 
denotes that player one chooses his ith action and player two his jth action. It is 
assumed that after a play, each player is informed of the acticdn chosen by the other 
player. Furthermore, a player knows the pay-off that he can receive under each 
outcome. Finally, each player knows the other’s preference oydef:tlg on the space 
of outcomes, i.e., in the examp e above, player 1 (2) knows ttia player 2’s (l’s) 
preference ordering for the four outcomes in decreasing or-det VJ u-2, CQ,B~~, ~3 
t- - *- UI, a4, az). 
The sequential game descril)ed above captures the essence of the strategic 
interplay underlying a duopoly. Such a market is characterized by two firms 
(players) making the same product. Each quarter (play) a firm has to announce the 
price it will charge for its product. In the simplest case, the pricing decision can 
involve naming a “high” price (this corresponds to action 1 of that firm) or a “low” 
price (action 2). Finally, each firm is aware of the competition’s preferences, e.g., 
firm 1 is aware that ideally its competition would like to capture the market by 
pricing ‘*low” and wanting firm 1 to price “high”. However, a firm is generally not 
aware of the exact cost or revenue function of its competition. 
When this game is modeled along the lines of the first model in Section 2, 
X={(p’,~*)(O~pl~l,O~~*~l}wherep’ isfirmi’sprobabilityofchoosingits 
first option on a play. The updating mechanisms (ZYoc ct E 0) and probability 
measures (r( l 1 x), x E X} are given below, where ai is abbreviated by i. 
c @‘,P’) = (ft@'), ff(p2)), q E 0, (3. la) 
TV IP’,P2) =p’p2, ~(2~p’,p*)=p’(l-p*), 
~(3(P’,p2)=u-p’)p2, e+2’,p2)= w=p’)U-p2), 
(3.lb) 
where f i: [0, l]- [0, l] for i E (1,2,3,4} and j E { 1,2}. If the strategies of the two 
firms are @ ‘, p*), then after one pbay the strategies will be (f :(p’), f :(p’)) with 
probability r(i 1 pl, p’). This revision couldresult from a firm’s displeasure with the 
pay-ofI it received as a consequence of outcome i. Alternately, a firm may want to 
retaliate for what it considers an unreasonable move on the part of the other firm. 
It should be noted here that the pay-offs do not appear explicitly in the above 
model. However, they are taken into account when a firm revises its strategy (state) 
for the next play. The very nature of the functions f: and f:, ai E 0 are determined 
by the pay-off matrix, e.g., if each firm in the Guopoly were to selfishly pursue its 
own interest, the resulting outcome would be 04. I-Iqwever, a tacit compromise can 
lead to outcome g1 that both refer to (ark. It seems plausible then that f f and f: for 
i = 2,3 should be decreasing functions since outcomes o2 and c3 are likely to 
increase the chance:. of “price wars”. Similarly, the nature of the other updating 
mechanisms i decic:zd by the pay-off structure. 
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4. Issues of interest 
In the context of the iterated matrix game in Section 3, what are some of the 
questions we would like to answer? In addition to the transient characteristics, the 
long-run behavior is of interest. The players may “lock-in” on their cooperative 
strategy (i.e., both use action 1) or their competitive strategy (i.e., both use actiion 
2). It is also conceivable that no unique mode of play emerges in the long run. In 
Markov process jargon, these questions amount to finding whether the process is 
absorbing or ergodic. In the former case, one is interested in the absorption 
probabilities. In the latter case, one is interested in laws of large numbers, central 
limit theorems, etc. An issue that is more basic than that raised above is whether a 
sequential game has an equilibrium distribution defined on its state space. Loosely 
speaking, probability measure p on (X, 2) is said to be an equilibrium distribution 
for a sequential game if the states of tbe game continue to remain clistributed 
accordingly. For a “large” class of sequential games, the question raised above is 
answered affirmatively in the next section. 
5. Invariant probability measures for sequential games 
Some notation is introduced before stating the main result. For the most past, 
this notation is borrowed from Dunford and Schwartz [ll]. Let (X, 2) be the state 
space of a sequential game and P its transition kernel (see Section 2). Then 
associated with P are hounded linear operators T* and T, the first defined on 
B(X, .C), the Banach space of bounded, scalar valued, x-measurable functions f on 
X by T*f(x) = I P(x, dy)f(y), x E X, the second defined on ca(X, Z), the Banach 
space of countably additive, bounded scalar valued set functions m on 2, by 
Tm (A $ = s m (dx)P(x, A), A E 2. The operators T and T* behave as adjoints in 
that (m, T*f) = (Tm, f), for all m E ca(X, 2) and f E B(X, x), and where (,u, f) = 
Jfdp. Denote by ba(X,Z) the set of bounded finitely additive set functions on a 
topological space (X, 2). In the following paragraphs integration is sometimes with 
respect o finitely additive set functions. For more on this see [11], 111.2. 
Definition 5.1. Let (X, 2) be a measurable space. Then a net {pa, a! E D} in 
ba(X, 2) conoerges in the B(X, C) topology of ba(X, 2) iff (p,, f) -+ (p, f), for all 
fE WXJ). 
An easy consequence of this definition and Theorem 111.513, of [ll], is the next 
result where rca(X, 2) denotes the subset of regular set functions in ca(X, Yc). 
Lemma 5.2. Let (X, d) be a compact metric space, and C the a-field of Bevel sets of 
X. Then a net (pa, a! E D} in rca(X, 2) converges in the B(X, 2) topology ijy 
(pa,f)+(p,f), for all f E WW. 
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The m& result of this section is now stated. In the follow:ng paragraphs 
when wi’talk about a game on B(X, x), we mean that the operator T* induced by 
the game maps B(X, Z) into itself. 
Theorem 5.3. Let (X, cl) be a compact metric space and Z: the topology induced by 
the metric d. Then every sequential game on B(X, 2) htas an equilibriram distribution. 
For each x E X the sequence of probability measures 
has a subsequence that converges in the B(X,S) topology of rca(X,Z), to an 
invariant probability measure Pi@, l ). 
The proof of this theorem follows from the 
Lemma 5.4, Let (X, 2) be a measurable space. 
following lemma. 
Then 2(X, S), the set of probability 
measures on (X? Z) is compact in the B(X, 2Z) topology of ba(X, 2). Furthermore, it 
is a convex set. 
Proof, The convexity of Z(X, S,! is routinely established. Any reference to 
compactness, convergence, tc., in the following is to be interpreted with respect o 
the B(X, 2Y) topology of ba(X, 2). For compactness, it suffices to show (because of 
[ 111, V, 4.3) that 2(X, Z) is closed as a subset of the compact ball BI = 
(g E ba(X, 2) 1 lip 11 s 1). Therefore, let {p,, cy E D) be a net in 2(X, if) such that pa 
converges to pl E B,. By Definition 5.1, (p,,f)-+(pI,fb for all fE B(X,E). Ely 
successively taking f = 9 such that A E 2Z, we: see that pI 0 and p,(X) = 1. The 
Vitali-Wahn-Saks theorem [ 1 l), III, 7.4) guarantees pl E ca(X, 2). 
Proof (Theorem 3). By Lemma 5.4 for each x E X there exists a subsequence 
which converges to P,(x, 9) E 2(X, 2). The invariance of P,(x, l ) is easily estab- 
lished (following Yosida [38]): 




P,(x, dt )f(z) for all f E B(X, 2). 
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Therefore, .P,(x, E) = $P@,dy)P(y, E) for all E E C. The existence of an in- 
variant probability measure can also be established by the Mar:cov, Kakut:ani fixed 
point theorem ([Ill. V. 10.6). The proof is omitted. 
6. A taxonomy for sequential games 
In the following discussion X denotes the state space of a game. 
Definition 6.1. A state e E X is said to be a fixed point of a game if whenever the 
game is in state e, it remains there on all future plays, i.e., lr*,(e) = e, for u E 0, 
such that ~(a 1 e) B 0. 
Definition 6.2, A fixed point e E X is an absorbing state (random fixed point) of the 
game if there is a starting state from which there is a positive probability that the 
game will eventually reach state e, i.e., P,,, (lim,.,, X,, = e) > 0. More generally a 
coilection of fixed points (e,, . . . , er} are the absorbing states (random fixed ,twints) 
of the game if P,,, (lim,.,, X” E {cl,. . . , e,}} = 1. 
Definition 6.3. A subset E C X is said to be the unique ergo& kernel of the game 
if P&E)= 1 for all x E E and P,,,{w : lim,,,,X,,(W)E E) = f. 
These definitions motivate the following taxonomy for sequential games. 
Definition 6.4, A sequential game is absorbing if it has at least one absorbing state 
(random fixed point). In contrast, games that have a unique ergotlic kernel are 
refered to as ergo& games.* 
A second way of classifying games uses the notion of quasikompactness, A 
bounded linear operator T* on a Banach space (B, 11 e 11) is said to be quasLcompact 
if there exists .a compact operator V and 5~ positive integer k such that 11 I/ll(lh - VII < 
1. For properties of compact operators, see [ 111, V1.4. 
Definition 6.5. A sequential game is said to be compact if the operator T* induced 
via its transition kernel, satisfies the requirements of the ‘Yosida-Kakutani uniform 
ergodic theorem (391, i.e., it is a quasi-compact operator. All other games are 
referred to as non-compact games 
The next section contains two theorems that help identify if a compact gamt: is 
ergodic or absorbing. In the sequel when we refer to a game on a function space F, 
we mean that the operator T” induced by the game maps F’ into itself. 
330 A.F. Sanghvi / Sequential games as stochastic processes 
7. Ere;;zdic behavior of compact games 
Let the compact metric space (X, d) denote the state space of a sequential game. 
This section restricts attention to compact gsmes on the Banach space C(X) of 
bounded, real valued continuous functions on X. The symbol Or”(x) denotes the 
set of states accessible from state m in n transitions, i.e., t C= Or”(x) iff P” (x, (t}) > 0, 
and Z = (eI, e2,. . . , e,}, denotes the collection of all the fixed points of the game. 
Random fixed point Theorem 7.1. If Z = {e], e2,. . . , ek} and for each t E X there 
exists an integer Q! (t) E { 1,2,. . . , k} such that d(Or”(t), e&-)0 for all t E X, then 
the game is absorbing with random fixed points (ergodic kernels) et, e2,. . . , ek. 
Specifically, suppose the game starts in state t. Then 
* the Markov process of state sequences X, converges to a random 
fixed point ek, P, a.s. (7 1) . 
Uniform and geometric convergence results to an invariant limiting 
distribution P; in that for some real numbers M and E >O, 
lubx,E)P”(x,E)-Pl(x,E)@M/(l+~)“foralln~O. (7 2) . 
The absorption probabilities are grven by PI(t, e, ) = y,(t), u = 
192 , . . . , k such th!at T*y, = y,, y, E C(X). (7 3) . 
,For each t E X there exists real numbers M and E >O such that 
tIE[f(X,)]-E[f(X,)]ll~Mgf((/(l+&)”, n 20, f E C(X) where 
E[f(X”)] = $ P”(t, dx)f (x) and E[f(Xm)] = s P&. dx)f(x). (7 4) . 
Theorem 7.2. If Z = Qi and there exists a point e E X such that d (Or” (t), e)+O for 
all t E X, then the sequential game is ergodic and regular. Specifically, there exists a 
unique, regular, ergodic kernel E and a unique limiting invariant distribution P,( l , E) 
such that 
Pl(t, E) = 1 for all t E X and P(t, E) = 1 for afll t E E. l%e con- 
vergence to the limiting distribution is uniform and geometric in that 
there exist numbers M and E >O such that (7 5) . 
lub,. E 1 P” (t, E) -- Pl(t, E) I s M/( 1 + E )“, n 3 0. The asymptotic prob - 
ability of being in E E C is P I(t, E) = y (t)x (E) for all t E X. Here 
y E C(X) and x E rca(X, 2) are the unique fixed points of the 
operators T * and T respectively. (7 6) . 
There exist real numbers K and E 3 0 such that for f E C(X) 
llE[f(Xn)] -E[f(X=)]II s K Ilf II/I1 + Ejn, n a 0. (7 7) . 
Proof of Theorem 7.1. By Theorem II in [39] there exist ergodic kernels E,, a! = 
132 , . . . , I such that lub xExP”(~, A) 6 M/(1 + E)” ‘for n > 0 and some real numbers 
M and E > 0 and where A = X - zb=, E,. From the Borel-Cantelli Lemma 
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P, (0: lim,,, X&o)E u:s, Em} = 1. Now k = 1. This follows from Theorem 8 in 
[39], the fact that each fixed point ei must be in some kernel and that a kernel Ei 
cannot contain two or more fixed points. Therefore, without loss of generality, let 
e, EEi, i = 1,2,..., 1. NOW {ei} = Ei since Theorem 8 in 1391 ensures that the 
ergodic kernels are the smallest sets with the property that P(x, Ep) = 1 for all 
x E Ea. The hypothesis of the theoreIfil mplies, because of a result due to Norman 
[ZS], that T* has no angle variables. Now (7.2) and (7.4) follow immediately from 
Theorem S in [39]. Since the ergodic kernels are singletons, it follows from 
Theorem 7 in [39] that the probability measures x,, cy = 1,2,. . . I are dirac measures 
with support {e*}, (Y = 1,2,. . . , 2. Finally (7.3) follows from Theorem 6 im [39]. 
Proof of Theorem 7.2. The hypothesis of this theorem implies, because of a result 
due to Norman [25], that T* has no angle variables (i.e. unity is the only eigenvalue 
of T* of modulus one) and A,.(l), the eigen-space of T* corresponding to the 
eigenvalue is one dimensional. The theorem now follows from Theorems 5 and 
6 in [39]. 
8. Some suffkient conditions for a game to be compact 
Applicability of the results of Section 7 to a sequential game requires cornFact- 
ness. Sufficient conditions that imply compactness are contained in Yosida and 
Kakutani [39] and Doob [9], but ofte!.l are hard to verify. Doeblin and Fortet [6] 
have given some conditions that are easy to verify in our models. Their operator T* 
was defined on (H(X), 11 l llL), the Banach space of Holder continulous functions on a 
compact metric space (X, d) with [\fllL - Mcf) + Ilfll, where I( l II refers to the 
uniform norm and M(f) = Sup,, Ip(x) - f(y)/ / d(x, y ). The range of T* is 
(C(X), 11 l 11). With ai abbreviated by i and the cardinality of 0 = r, we have 
Theorem 8.1 (Doeblin and Fortet [6]). Let T(i 1.) E H(X), i = 1,2,. . . , r such that 
XI-, M(T(i 1 a)) s 1. Furthermore, suppose c(Si) s K c 1 for i = 1,2,. . . , r where 
c(C) = Sup d(K (x), ri (y))/d(x, y) 
x.yEX 
is the modulus of r,. Then T* defined by 
T*f(x) = 2 T(i 1 x)f(ri(X)) 
i==l 
is a quasi-strongly compact operator on (H(X), II . llL). 
Subsequent generalizations do not go essentially beyond those of Doeblin and 
Fortet. For example, Ionescu Tulcea and Marinescu [ 141 only require that 
M(T(i I-)) C 00 for all i E 0. Isaac 1161 further relaxed the contraction condition to 
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for all x, y E .Y and where 0 < at < 1 for all i. This condition is clearly implied by 
d(Ti(x),ri(y))~c(~)d(x,y) f or all x, y E .Y and where 0 <: c(G) < 1 for all i. 
Other conditions in the same spirit are due tcr Ionescu Tu!cea and Marinescu [14] 
and Norman [26]. 
We refer to the Holder continuity condition together with one of the contraction 
type requirements tated above as a conditi “s of the Doebh, Fortet type. A 
condition of the Doeblin-Fortet ype is sufficient o ensure the compactness of the 
game, and therefore the applicability of the results *K this paper. 
9. Applications of results to the example of section 3 
The results of this paper are now applied to the duopoly game of Section 3. 
For the remainder of this section the metric d((xl, x,),(y,, yz)) = 
Max(lxl- yllh-- y& will be used. X is compact in this metric. To assure the 
compactness of this game, the operators ri and measures T( l 1 x) are assumed to 
satisfy a condition of the Doeblin-Fortet ype (see Section 8). From (3.lb) it is clear 
that T(i 1 x)E W(X) for each i E 0. Hence, the only real restriction the 
Doeblin-Fortet imposes is that the operator fi satisfy a contraction assumption of 
the type mentioned in Section 8. Two such examples are indicated below. 
~(P’,p2)=(0i +(1_8ilp’, 4i +(l-@i)p*), i = 1,4, (9. la) 
~(p1,p2)=((1-6i)~‘,(1-(bii)p2), i =2,3, where &#I E(Q1). 
(9.lb) 
A second example is 
Up’, p’) = (up” + bp’ + G +I+ (1 - &)p2”‘), (9.2a) 
r2(p I, p’) = (82p lrn2, qJ2p **I), (9.2b) 
r;(p’, p’) = (8#‘““, +Jp*“‘), (9.2c) 
Lb ‘, p’) = (04 + (1 - 84)p lrn’, 44 + (1 - &)p *“‘), (9.2d) 
where mi and rtf, i = 1,2,3,4 are integers greater than or equal to one 
a+b+cE[O, 11, cE[O, l]#, bE(max{2lal-1, -2a),1-2(aI), 
(l-&E (0,:) fori=1,4, 
fori=2.3 and (1-&)E 
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In formulae (9.1) each player is using a linear operator of the Bush--Mosteller [4] 
type to review his behavior strategy after each play. It is easy to check that the 
modulus of ri, C(C) = max(c(f:), a) = max(1 - ei, 1 - 4i) c 1. This ensures that 
the game is compact. The same conclusion is valid for the game with non-linear l-‘i 
as specified by (9.2). The operators in (9.1) and (9.2) have been chosen merely for 
the purposes of illustrating the results of this paper. One could as well have chosen 
some other operators that satisfy a condition of the Doeblin-Fortet ype. Of course, 
the asymptotic behavior of the game as reflected by the model will depend upon the 
choice of the operators. This choice depe,nds upon the ‘“type” of players - risk 
averse, risk taker, “cooperative”, “competitive”, etc. Once the operators are 
specified, the set of all fixed points of r,, i = 1,2,3,4 is identified. The subset 2 of 
the fixed points of the game is then identified. Next Theorem 7.1 or 7.2 is applied to 
establish if the game is ergodic or absorbing. This procedure is illustrated for a 
special case of the m: :del of Section 3 is which the operators Ti take the form (9.1) 
or (9.2). It is straightttirward to verify that the set of fixed points of the game 
described by (9.1) is given by 2 = ((1, 1)). The set Z for the game described. by (9.2) 
is @. The following theorem summarizes the asymptotic behavior of the sequential 
game described by (9.1). 
Theorem 9.1. For the game of Section 3 described by (3.1) and (9.1), 
im-(pi& = (1,l)) = 1, i.e., with probability one the firms 
converge to a Pareto optimal (‘kooperative “) outcome. Furtaermore, 
this convergence is geometric, in that (9 3) . 
there exist real numbers E,M,E >O such klzat 
/E[f(X,)]-E[f(X,)]lIs Mllf Ii/(1 - E)~ for all n 20 a)?d 
f E C(X). In particular, for example, 11 E@ A, p’,) - 1 II s 3 M/( 1 + f: )“. 
(9 4) . 
Proof. Here 2 = ((1, 1)). This theorem will follow from Theorem 7.1 once it is 
shown that d(Or”(p’,p2),(1,1))-*0 for all (P’,P~)EX. When @&p$=(O&O), a 
possible sample path is 
(0,o) + (e,, dd-+ (e, + (1 - e,)e,, 44 + (1 - dhkW+ . l l . 
This implies that 
(1 - (1 - el)n-leq, 1 - (1 - &)l”l-l+J E Or”@, 0). 
Therefore, d(Ot”(O,O),(l, 1)) s max((1 - e,)n-led, (1 - tpl)n-l&)+Om If (p&p;) = 
(0, l), a possible sample path of states is 
(0, 1) + (0, l - 43) + (44, (1 - 44x1 - 6)) 
+ (0, + (1 - e,)e,, & + (1 - &)(l - +4)U - M)+ l o l . 
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This ,Il:plies that 
(I- Ii - el)n-2e4, 1 - (1 - 4,)fi-“(l- +*)(I - &)E Or”(R 1). 
Therefore, 
d(OY” (0, l), (19 1)) - < max((l - ely-2e4, (1 - dh)“_‘(1 - d5,)(1- 43)) 
G max((1 - e,)n-2, (1 - ~I)“-2)-+O. 
The case (p&pi) = (1,0) is symmetric. The cases @‘,0),(0,p2),(p1, l),(l$) and 
(pl, p2) E 2, where J? denotes the interior of X can be proved similarly. Hence 
(9.3) follows (7.2) and (9.4) from (7.5). The second part of (9.4) follows from the first 
part by letting f(P ‘, p”) = pip’- 
Theorem 9.2. T/M game of Section 3 described by Eq. (3.1) und Eq. (9.2) is ergo&c. 
Proof. Since 2 = @, this result follows from Theorem (7.2) since it is straightfor- 
ward to verify that d(Orr@‘,p2),(0,0))+0 for all @‘,p’)E X. 
10. Concluding remarks 
The results of Sections 7 and 8 are applicable to some of the models of 
multiperson interactions tudied by Suppes and Atkinson (35) Burke (31 and 
Rapoport and Chammah [29] and lead to more general results than hitherto known, 
e.g,, we can show that the model of Rapoport and Chammah [29] is absorbing with 
random fixed point {( 1, 1)). They were able to support his conclusion by conducting 
actual experiments and by simulating a few sample paths in one special case. 
It is felt that the first model discussed in Section 2 is a naive representation of 
behavior in game-like situations since the players are modeled as robots. We 
strongly favor the Bayesian model which is more in the spirit of the fictitious play 
literature in game theory, e.g., see Bore1 [2] and Brown [S]. If the duopoly game of 
Section 3 were modeled along these lines p’(p’) would denote the firm I’s (II’s) 
prior probability on II(I) choosing its first action on the next play. Given firm I’S 
(II’s) state is p’(cp’), it chooses its first action with probability S’(J#S~(~~)). 
Functions 8’ and 6’ are the firms’ decision rules. The probabilities for the four 
outcomes are now given by 
7(1I pl, p’) = 6yp’)S2(p2), T(2 (p’,p2) = S’@‘)(l - s’(p’):, 
7(3 )pl,p2) = (1- 6Q+!j2(p”), 7(4 1 p’, p”) = (1 - sL@‘)(l - SQ2)). 
The operator I’i in this model revises prior distributions and not strategies as the 
previous model. Such “Bayesian” models have been studied by Sanghvi and Sobel 
[32], usir,g the results in this paper. In particular, the result in Section 5 on the 
existence of an invariant probability distribution is used in the above mentioned 
paper to derive the ergodic properties for a non-compact sequential game. 
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